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Abstract
In category-based induction tasks, a robust finding is that pos-
itive observations raise the judged likelihood of a conclusion
and negative observations lower judged likelihood. We present
evidence that negative observations can raise the judged like-
lihood. In particular, we asked participants to judge the like-
lihood of a conclusion after introducing them to different sets
of premises either containing one positive observation or the
same positive observation and a negative observation. We
found that when the negative observation is dissimilar to the
positive observation, willingness to accept a conclusion is
raised. Moreover, results from a simultaneous hypothesis gen-
eration task suggest that the rise in judged conclusion likeli-
hood is due to a peculiar shift in the hypothesis space of the
reasoner, in that the hypothesis with the largest extension, yet
still consistent with all premises gains disproportionate popu-
larity when introducing a dissimilar negative observation.
Keywords: induction; non-monotonicity; reasoning; sampling
assumptions;
Introduction
People often find themselves in situations that require judg-
ments based on incomplete knowledge, derived from an in-
complete set of observations. From experience with traffic
lights, we can conclude that red is diagnostic for dangerous
situations (positive observations), and we will refrain from
crossing the road. However, we have also encountered traffic
lights on lonely nights, when there is no traffic. In that situ-
ation, red does not necessarily indicate danger (negative ob-
servation). How do we combine these observations to make
a decision about crossing the road? The world is not suffi-
ciently friendly to provide us with an exhaustive set of ob-
servations. But we do not want to stay on the same side of
the road all our lives. We want to see the other side of the
road! Therefore inference to uncertain conclusions, gener-
ally referred to as induction, is omnipresent in everyday life
and almost equally widely studied in cognitive science (Heit,
2000).
A common paradigm to study induction a is the category-
based induction task: Participants are asked to infer the pres-
ence of a feature in a conclusion category on the basis of a set
of observations. The observations are presented as premises
of the argument. For example:
Premise: Tigers have sesamoid bones
———————————————-
Conclusion: Lions have sesamoid bones
A number of regularities have been reported regarding how
people respond to such problems, one of which forms the
topic of the present paper. Following intuition, but also ac-
cording to the main theories of inductive reasoning (see, e.g.,
Heit, 2000), there exists a monotonic relation between the
number of observations and the strength of an argument: As
more objects displaying the property are observed, a conclu-
sion will be judged more likely (see, e.g., Osherson, Smith,
Wilkie, Lpez, & Shafir, 1990). Similarly, as objects are ob-
served that do not have the property, the judged likelihood of
a conclusion decreases (e.g., Heussen, Voorspoels, Verheyen,
Storms, & Hampton, 2011). We will refer to this general find-
ing as the monotonicity principle.
Put differently, the monotonicity principle predicts that a
positive observation1 raises argument strength, and a nega-
tive observation2 lowers argument strength. In case the ob-
servation is extremely dissimilar, and thus irrelevant to the
conclusion, argument strength remains the same. For exam-
ple, the likelihood of the conclusion ’Lions have sesamoid
bones’ is raised by the observation that tigers have sesamoid
bones, is lowered by the observation that leopards do not
have sesamoid bones and remains the same by the observa-
tion that tea cups do not have sesamoid bones. Additional
relevant positive and negative observations will respectively
raise and lower the argument strength further (asymptotically,
obviously).
Recently we have presented evidence that suggests that
negative observations can in some cases increase argument
strength, contrary to what the monotonicity principle predict
(Heussen et al., 2011). In a forced choice paradigm, partici-
pants showed a preference for an argument of the following
form as compared to an argument without the second, nega-
tive premise:
Mozart’s music elicits alpha waves in the brain
Metallica’s music does not elicit alpha waves in the brain
——————————————————————
Bach’s music elicits alpha waves in the brain
A potential explanation for the results of (Heussen et al.,
2011) is that negative observations point the reasoner to a rel-
evant dimension to base inference upon (Medin, Goldstone,
and Gentner (1993)). In the above argument, the negative
observation highlights a commonality between Mozart and
Bach, not shared by Metallica, i.e., that being classical music
1An object displaying the property.
2An object that does not display the property
is the crucial feature to base inference upon. As the hypothe-
sis that classical music is the crucial feature gains weight, the
argument will be considered stronger. In addition, by explic-
itly contradicting some of the potential hypotheses (e.g.,all
music elicits alpha waves), negative evidence clearly helps
in reducing the number of hypotheses. This is expected to
raise believe in the hypotheses that remain consistent with
the premises after the negative observation.
Outline
The present study aims at further investigating the rise in ar-
gument strength following a negative observation. In partic-
ular, our aim is twofold. First, we want to replicate the effect
in a between-subjects rating task, in which we compare gen-
eralization judgments of participants who were not presented
with negative observations are compared to judgments by par-
ticipants who were. This differs considerably from Heussen
et al. (2011), where a forced choice paradigm was used. Sec-
ond, we ask participants to generate hypotheses after intro-
ducing the observations. In this way, we can examine how
the hypothesis space of people confronted with negative ob-
servation changes and how this relates to their generalization
judgments.
Following Heussen et al. (2011), we hypothesize that a
negative observation will raise the willingness to accept a
conclusion whenever it points to a dimension that can be used
to make the required generalization. In effect, we expect that
the projection of a feature from Mozart’s music to Bach’s mu-
sic is facilitated when a negative observation excludes other
types of music, and points to classical music as the correct
extension of the novel feature. Similarly, when projecting a
property from Bach’s music to Nirvana’s music, the projec-
tion is expected to be facilitated by a negative observation
outside the category that entails both subcategories (music).
Adding the premise that the sound of a falling rock does not
have the property, is thus expected to increase the willing-
ness to project the property to Nirvana’s music. Moreover,
we expect that the hypothesis space of participants will vary
accordingly.
Experiment
Method
Participants Participants were 172 bachelor students psy-
chology who volunteered for course credits.
Materials We used 12 argument topics taken from Heussen
et al. (2011) (music, painters, public figures, types of ships,
types of glass, types of displays, water bodies, fruit, water
birds, insects, polar animals). In each topic, a hierrachical
structure is present, comprising of a category (e.g., music),
two subcategories (A: classical music and B: rock music) and
a supordinate category (C: sound).
Each of the topics has a base argument built from one
premis from subcategory A (e.g., Mozart’s music has X). De-
pending on the condition, negative premises are added from
the other subcategory (B), or a different category (C). Thus,
either the additional premise contains information regarding
a member of subcategory A (e.g., Vivaldi’s music), or the
premise contains information on a member of subcategory
B (e.g., Metallica’s music) or the premise presents informa-
tion from category C (e.g., the sound of a waterfall). Table 1
presents an overview of the premises for the topic music.
In Heussen et al. (2011), only one conclusion from subcat-
egory A was used. For the present experiment, we added two
conclusion categories to each topic: One from subcategory
B (e.g., Nirvana’s music), and one from category C (e.g., the
sound of a falling rock). The properties that were to be gener-
alized from premises to conclusions, were intuitively realistic
characteristics that participants were likely to have very little
knowledge about (e.g., contain lycopene; create conversion
currents; elicit alpha waves in the brain).
Table 1: an overview of the simtulus material for the topic
’music’. Entries in bold refer to items that are presented in
every condition (e.g., the base premise ”Mozart’s music elic-
its alpha waves”).
Type Premise Conclusion
subcategory (A) Mozart, Vivaldi Bach
subcategory (B) Metallica Nirvana
superordinate (C) falling rock waterfall
Procedure The experiment had the form of a web-based
survey. On each trial, participants were presented with a
short scenario describing that specialists in the domain of in-
terest (e.g., neuroscientists) had recently made novel discov-
eries. This was followed with the premise (or premisses) of
an argument. For example, participants were given following
premises:
Mozart’s music elicits alpha waves in the brain. (1)
After reading the information, participants received two
successive tasks. First, in the hypothesis generation task,
they were asked to come up with a rule underlying the ob-
servations, (e.g., ”classical music elicits alpha waves in the
brain”). They were asked to type their hypothesis in a textbox
in one or two sentences. Second, in the generalization task,
participants were asked to judge how likely the three conclu-
sions associated with the argument were by moving a bar on
a continuous scale running from 1 to 100 for each of the con-
clusions.
For each topic, we constructed six premise sets, varying
the type of observations, and the ”‘sign”’ (positive or nega-
tive) . For each premise set the exact same three conclusions
were judged for likelihood, but the premise set varied across
condtions. For the present purpose we will discuss only three
conditions that allow crucial comparisons to test for the effect
of negative observations. In the base condition, referred to as
posA, participants received the base premise, as in (1). In
condition posAnegB, a negative observation from a different
subcategory is added to the base premise:
Mozart’s music elicits alpha waves in the brain.
Metallica’s music does not elicit alpha waves in the
brain.
(2)
In a third condition, posAnegC a negative observation was
added to the base premise, disclosing information on a mem-
ber of the same superordinate category:
Mozart’s music elicits alpha waves in the brain.
The sound of a falling rock does not elicit alpha waves
in the brain
(3)
In total, 12 x 6 arguments were constructed. The 72 ar-
guments were distributed across 6 lists so that each list con-
tained each of the twelve topics (so participants did not see
the same topic twice), and a list contained 2 arguments for ev-
ery type of premise set (so each participant got two arguments
from every condition). The lists were distributed randomly
across participants. The order of arguments within a list was
random for each participant, as well as the order of the con-
clusions in each argument. The same two practice items pre-
ceded the lists for every participants in order to familiarize
the participants with the procedure. These two items were
not included in the analyses. The experiment took no longer
than 20 minutes
Premise sets posA, posAnegB and posAnegC form the ob-
ject of the present examination. The structure of premise sets
4 to 6 is listed in Table 2, but will not be discussed in the
present paper. As can be seen in table 2, these premise sets
do not contain negative observations, except the “completely
saturated” premise set 6.
Table 2: Schematic overview of the experiment. ’+’ refers
to a positive observation, ’-’ to a negative observation. ’++’
means that two premises from the same subcategory were
presented in the corresponding condition. In the present pa-
per we focus on the first three premise sets.
Cond subcat A subcat B cat C # premises
posA + 1
posAnegB + - 2
posAnegC + - 2
4 ++ 2
5 + + 2
6 + + - 3
Results
Generalization
To recapitulate, participant were shown a set of premises (ob-
servations), and asked to judge the likelihood of three conclu-
sions. One conclusions concerned a member of the same sub-
category as the base premise (subcategory A), a second con-
clusion concerned a member of a different subcategory (sub-
category B) and a third conclusion a member of the shared
superordinate category (category C). In this section, we ex-
amine the manner in which these generalization judgments
vary as a function of the premise set that is presented, and
in particular, whether adding a negative observation to the
premise set can raise argument strength. In what follows, it is
informative to keep in mind that, according to the monotonic-
ity principle, negative observations are expected to lower the
likelihood of a conclusion (or leave it unaltered).
Figure 1 presents the average scores of all three conclusion
likelihood judgments, averaged across participants and items,
as a function of the premise set. PosA introduces only the
base premise, posAnegB adds a negative observation of sub-
category B to the base premise and posAnegC adds a negative
observation of category C. In the two following sections, sta-
tistical analyses are presented to test for the effects of adding
negative observations to a premise set.
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Figure 1: Average judged conclusion likelihood for the three
types of conclusions, as a function of the premise set.
Generalizing to the same subcategory For the conclu-
sions that concern a member of subcategory A (e.g., conclu-
sions to Bach’s music if Mozart’s music is the base premise),
we are interested in two conditions that should lead to a
raise in conclusion likelihood as compared to the base argu-
ment, despite the negative observation in a premise set. As
in Heussen et al. (2011), we expect to observe a difference
between premise set posA and posAnegB, in which a nega-
tive observation from subcategory B is added to the premise
set. Additionally, we hypothesize that adding negative obser-
vation from an entirely different category, as in premise set
posAnegC, also raises argument strength. In Figure 1 the left
bars present the average judged likelihood of the conclusion
to a member of subcategory A as a function of the premise
set preceding the conclusion, and visual inspection confirms
our hypotheses.
We performed a mixed-effects model analyses with two
random effects (participants and topics), and two fixed effects
(list and premise set), and their interaction3. Premise set is a
3For the model formulation, we follow (Baayen, Davidson, &
Bates, 2008) in their discussion of mixed models for split plot de-
signs. The analyses were carried out in R, using the lme4 package
within subjects factor and list is a between subject variable.
Table 3 gives an overview of the main (fixed) effects of
premise set, and can be interpreted as follows: For premise
set posA, participants on average judge the likelihood of a
conclusion to a member of subcategory A to be 75.14. For
premise set posAnegB, in which a negative observation from
subcategory B is added, the judged likelihood drops with 2.26
according to the model4, a change that is not significant. For
premise set posAnegC, in which a negative observation from
a different category C is added, the judged likelihood is sig-
nificantly higher 11.12 points (p= .016).
Table 3: Effects of premise set on generalizing to a member
of subcategory A.
premise set MCMC estimate MCMC p-value
posA (base level) 75.14 < .001
posAnegB -2.26 .72
posAnegC 11.12 .016
In sum, we only find partial support for our hypothesis.
In particular, premise sets as used in (Heussen et al., 2011),
adding a negative observation from a different subcategory,
do not lead to a significant rise in argument strength. We do,
however, observe a strong rise in argument strength, when a
more distant negative observation – from a different category
– is added to the premise set.
Generalizing to a different subcategory For the conclu-
sion to a member of subcategory B (e.g., Nirvana has X; the
base premise is Mozart), we hypothesize that a negative ob-
servation from a different category (but shared superordinate
category, e.g., the sound of a falling rock) can raise judged
conclusion likelihood. In Figure 1 the average judged likeli-
hood of conclusions to subcategory B for the relevant premise
sets is presented in the middle bar of every group, and a rise
in mean judged likelihood from premise set posA to premise
set posAnegC can be observed. A quantitative test of the dif-
ference was performed using mixed model analyses with two
random effects (items and participants) and two fixed effects
(list and premise set). As in the previous section, this model
was preferable to alternative models in terms of AIC and log
likelihood deviance.
Table 4 summarizes the effects of premise set. When
adding a negative observation from subcategory B, judged
likelihood of the conclusion is lowered by 16.55, nearly sig-
nificantly (p=.08). Note that in this case the premise set con-
tains a negative observation form the same subcategory as the
conclusion. More interestingly, when adding a negative ob-
servation from a different category (the sound of a falling rock
does not have X), judged likelihood increases an impressive
(Bates & Sarkar, 2007).
4Note that the model estimate for posAnegB is negative, contrary
to what you would expect on the basis of Figure 3 due to addition of
list as a factor.
Table 4: Effects of premise set on generalizing to a member
of subcategory B.
premise set MCMC estimate MCMC p-value
posA (base level) 33.93 < .001
posAnegB -16.55 .08
posAnegC 33.61 < .001
33.61.
Conclusions Our analyses of the judged likelihood of the
conclusions have revealed convincing evidence that negative
observations can raise argument strength in some circum-
stances. In particular, we found that a negative observation
from a seemingly irrelevant category, can substantially raise
the judged likelihood of the conclusion to a member of the
same subcategory as the base premise as well as to a member
of a different subcategory.
Contrary to (Heussen et al., 2011), we do not find support
for a rise in judged likelihood of a conclusion to a member
of the same subcategory when a negative observation from a
different subcategory is introduced. Note that Heussen et al.
used a forced choice paradigm, and report effects that, while
significant, were very subtle. Perhaps our methodology was
not able to identify these effects.
Hypothesis generation
Before making the generalization judgments, participants
were asked to generate a hypothesis that they believed ex-
plained the observations in the premises. This allows us to
peak at the type of hypotheses participants entertained when
confronted with negative observations
We differentiated between four types of hypotheses: First,
a hypothesis can state that the property is only applicable to
the base premise (e.g., “only Bach has X”). Second, a hypoth-
esis can generalize the property to the subcategory of which
the base premise is a member (e.g., “all classical music has
X”), or, the third type, to the entire category (“all music has
X”) or, in the fourth case, to the entire superordinate category
(“all sound has X”). We classified each rule according to its
consequential region following this scheme. Hypotheses that
did not fit the scheme, for example due to reporting another
subcategory, an unspecified subcategory (e.g., “some types of
music”) or a causal explanation, were coded as “other”5.
Figure 2 presents the relative frequencies of each type of
hypothesis being generated as response to premise sets posA,
posAnegB and posAnegC. To quantify and test differences in
hypothesis generation between premise sets, we performed
logistic regressions with premise set and list as predictors and
a binary variable indicating whether the type of hypothesis
was generated as dependent variable. The regressions were
performed seperately for each type of hypothesis type .
5The criterion for classifying was the literal appearance of the
intended terms in the rule (and, obviously, in an unambiguous way).
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Figure 2: Relative frequency of generating a certain type of
hypothesis as a function of the premise set.
Figure 2 suggests three trends are . First, hypotheses that
restrict the property to the base premise are significantly less
frequent as a negative observation is introduced (with com-
parison level posA, for posAnegB: Wald = −2.4, p = .01;
and for posAnegC: Wald = −4.7, p < .001). Second, hy-
potheses that attribute the property to the entire subcate-
gory A are more frequent when a negative observation from
subcategory B is introduced (but not significantly, Wald =
.76, p = .45), and significantly less frequent when a neg-
ative observation from category C is introduced (Wald =
−3.74, p < .001). Third, hypotheses that project the feature
to the entire category are less common when introducing a
negative observation from a subcategory (Wald =−6.23, p <
.001), yet more common when introducing a negative obser-
vation from a different category (Wald = 6.02, p < .001).
Conclusions The hypothesis space in case of arguments
with negative observations from subcategory B or category
C is substantially altered as compared to the one premise ar-
guments (posA). Moreover, the shifts in generation frequency
seem to follow results in the generalization tasks. In particu-
lar the increase in subcategory B conclusion likelihood when
premise set posAnegC is observed, is clearly associated to an
increase in the hypothesis that music is the relevant category.
Not only do some hypotheses become more frequently
generated (as can be expected when a number of hypothe-
ses are excluded due to a negative observation), the relative
differences between types of hypotheses change consider-
ably across different conditions. In particular, for premise set
posAnegB, hypotheses that refer to subcategory A are dis-
proportionately more popular. For premise set posAnegC,
hypotheses that refer to the entire category are disproportion-
ately more frequent. Note that for these premise sets, other
hypotheses that are also consistent with the observations be-
come less popular. This suggests that more is going on than
evenly redistributing the belief of excluded hypotheses across
remaining hypotheses. We will come back to this issue in the
discussion.
General discussion
We have presented evidence against the universality of the
monotonicity principle in inductive reasoning. Negative ob-
servations can indeed raise argument strength when they
come from a different category than the one shared by the
positive observation and the conclusion. Moreover, we found
a clear relation with the type of hypotheses that are gener-
ated to account for the premise observations. In general, there
seems to be a dramatic rise in the weight of the largest hypoth-
esis that is consistent with both positive and negative obser-
vations in the premise set. In what follows, we will discuss
the relation of these findings to earlier violations of mono-
tonicity in inductive reasoning, and in relation to the sam-
pling assumptions that people have that is, ideas about how
the observations are presented to them.
Relation to positive non-monotonicity
For positive observations, a violation of the monotonic-
ity principle has already been documented (Medin, Coley,
Storms, & Hayes, 2003), in that under some circumstances
positive observations can lower conclusion likelihood. For
example, consider following two arguments:
Brown bears have X
——————————-
Goats have X
(4)
Brown bears have X
Polar bears have X
——————————-
Goats have X
(5)
Medin et al. (2003) report that participants judge argument
(4) stronger than argument (5). According to Medin et al., the
addition of the positive observation in (5) reinforces a prop-
erty that is shared among the premises but is not applicable to
the conclusion. Put differently, by adding a positive observa-
tion, more weight is given to the hypothesis that the being a
bear is crucial for the novel property, and since this property
is not shared by the conclusion, it is judged less likely.
The non-monotonicity from adding a negative observation
is strikingly symmetric to the non-monotonicity reported by
(Medin et al., 2003). Consider following two arguments:
Mozart’s music has X
——————————–
Metallica’s music has X
(6)
Mozart’s music has X
The sound of a falling rock does not have X
——————————————————
Metallica’s music has X
(7)
In the present study, argument (6) was judged stronger by
participants. Following our analyses of the hypotheses gener-
ated by participants, the addition of the negative observation
from outside the music category, drives people to think that
“being music” is the most likely hypothesis, rather than, e.g.,
classical music or Mozart’s music. By virtue of giving more
weight to the music hypothesis, Metallica’s music is judged
more likely to have X.
In sum, whereas in the positive case, a reasoner’s hypoth-
esis ”tightens” to a small subcategory (e.g., bears) by intro-
ducing an observation that is very similar to the base premise
(e.g., another type of bear), in the negative case, a reasoner’s
hypothesis seems to “broaden” to a large category, by in-
troducing an observation that is very dissimilar to the base
premise.
Sampling assumptions and non-monotonicity
The question then is how reasoners arrive at weighting ex-
actly these hypotheses more. From a naive probability point
of view, excluding certain hypotheses by adding negative ob-
servations will automatically lead to a redistribution of the
probability mass from the excluded hypotheses to remaining
hypotheses. In effect, it makes sense that other hypotheses
would indeed become more likely, and as a consequence a
particular conclusion could also become more likely. How-
ever, it is important to appreciate that, in the naive case, the
probability mass would be distributed evenly across the re-
maining hypotheses, so relative differences between different
hypotheses remain. This does not seem to hold in the present
results. Indeed, when a negative observation from a differ-
ent category is observed, as in (6), participants generated the
category hypothesis (all music has X) disproportionally more
frequently. While consistent with the observations in (6), the
subcategory hypothesis (all classical music has X) and the
base premise hypothesis (Mozart has X) experience a sub-
stantial drop in generation frequency, contrary to what one
would expect on the basis of naive probability theory.
Interestingly, the manner in which Bayesian models of in-
duction (e.g., Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001) cope with the
positive non-monotonicty effect, is by reweighting the re-
maining hypotheses when an observation is made. More pre-
cisely, depending on assumptions on how the particular ob-
servation is sampled from the environment, a Bayesian model
would predict that reasoners give more weight as a consis-
tent hypothesis is smaller (e.g., Navarro, Dry, & Lee, 2011;
Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001.
While technical adjustments to Bayesian inference in na-
ture6, sampling assumptions also represent a psychological
reality and implement what the reasoners’ assumptions are
on how the observations are presented to him . For example,
if a reasoner assumes that the observations in (5) are sam-
pled from the correct hypothesis (for example, because he
or she thinks the experimenter intentionally is trying to re-
veal the correct hypothesis), it is rational to attribute more
believe to the hypothesis that it is about bears. Yet, if the
reasoner believes the observations are made randomly in the
world, and he or she might as well have observed a refridger-
ator (presumably not having the property in that case) instead
6More specifically, in a weak sampling scheme, hypotheses are
not reweighted. In a strong sampling scheme hypotheses with a
smaller extension are given more weight
of a polar bear, the hypothesis that it is about bears does not
gain relative importance (for a more elaborate discussion, see
Navarro et al., 2011). Indeed, it would be bad luck on part
of the reasoner that he or she did not encounter a more in-
formative observation. The non-monotonicity effects, both
positive and negative, suggest that reasoners do not share that
assumption.
While the specific implementation of sampling assump-
tions discussed does not yet apply to negative evidence, a
similar reweighting mechanism might be at work when a rea-
soner is presented with negative evidence. Perhaps reasoners
assume that a negative observation is intentionally presented,
in such a way that it does not only exclude inconsistent hy-
potheses, but is informative as to which hypothesis is the cor-
rect one.
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